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Abstract
In this paper we present a Gentzen system for reasoning with
contrary-to-duty obligations. The intuition behind the system is that a
contrary-to-duty is a special kind of normative exception. The logical
machinery to formalise this idea is taken from substructural logics and
it is based on the definition of a new non-classical connective captur-
ing the notion of reparational obligation. Then the system is tested
against well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes.
1 Introduction
One of the main themes in the philosophical discussion on deontic logic is
about reasoning with contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations. In this perspec-
tive, it is widely acknowledged that the crisis of Standard Deontic Logic
(SDL) is strongly related to the formulation of some notorious paradoxes
centring around the regulation of the violation of obligations. Puzzles like
Chisholm’s and Forrester’s paradoxes, Reykjavik scenario and Mo¨bius strip
example, depict situations where various combinations of reparational and
unconditional obligations give rise to logical contradictions or counterintu-
itive conclusions. As a matter of fact, a great part of the efforts in deontic
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logic have been driven by solving these problems and a plethora of differ-
ent strategies have been accordingly proposed. A full analysis of all these
contributions is obviously beyond the scope of this paper.
However, we believe that some of those approaches deserve to be consid-
ered here in some detail. We refer in particular to the works whose starting
point can be summarised in the following thesis: “no logic of norms with-
out attention to the normative systems in which they occur” [15, p. 32].
Even though this idea at first sight seems to be obvious, it is of great value
since it proposes what we could call a “holistic reading” of normative rea-
soning. Actually, we think this intuition is fundamental for at least two
reasons. Firstly it reestabilishes the often neglected link between philoso-
phy of norms (specifically, philosophy of law) and deontic logic. It is quite
odd, for a legal philosopher, to conceive of norms in isolation. Norms in-
terplay with each other. Thus, a normative set can (must) have different
meanings and may (should) contribute to diverse conclusions if it is included
in distinct normative systems. The “spirit” of such norms changes according
to their systematic reading. Secondly, thanks to this approach to normative
reasoning, it is possible to give both a simple and appealing account of CTD
obligations and consequently solutions to the just mentioned paradoxes of
deontic logic.
In a wide sense, significant examples in this direction are some papers by
H. Prakken and M. Sergot [18, 19]. Basically, they regard CTD structures
as contextual obligations, that is obligations strictly relative to a certain
context of application. Accordingly, they are not just conditional obligations
which hold without restriction and so factual detachment is not in general
permitted. On the other hand, it must be the case that primary obligations
related to CTDs are still in force at least outside their specific context of
violation. Thus, the authors argue that some cases are inconsistent, in
particular when a CTD norm states a reparational obligation which is in
contradiction with an another primary obligation in the system. In logical
terms, this idea has been first implemented by the so-called principle of
“downwards inheritance” for checking the unrelatedness between contexts
and primary obligations [18]. Later, they developed a peculiar semantical
construction to characterise a preference ordering over the worlds which is
strictly sensitive of the “number” of reciprocal incompatibilities (potential
violations) between norms.
A different approach, inspired by similar intuitions, has been developed
in particular by D. Makinson and L. van der Torre. Their main idea, as
pointed out by Makinson [15] himself, can be traced back to a pioneering
work by Stenius [22] and it was later improved by Alchourro´n and Bu-
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lygin [2, 1]. This line of investigation is based on the intuition that any
obligation can be explained in terms of a consequence relation of what is
explicitly stated as obligatory in a normative system. Actually, Makinson
and van der Torre’s approach is a further step in this direction. Their anal-
ysis is meant to capture this original idea; in addition they impose some
constraints on the manipulation of conditional norms. As expected, some
restrictions are required both on strengthening of antecedent and on transi-
tivity, since this is vital in CTD contexts. A related point thus concerns the
directionality of normative conditionals. It is commonly acknowledged that
contraposition cannot be accepted: the consequence relation under which a
normative system is closed is not classical but is to be modelled by permit-
ting only a directional iterative detachment of obligations. The conditions
of such a detachment are in turn strictly connected with performing a con-
sistency check in the normative system. More precisely, the detachment of
an obligation B can only be obtained by using the regulations which are
consistent with the condition stated for B. If it is not the case, then B is a
not a consequence of the normative system. This task can be done within a
labelled deductive system based on the so-called Input-Output logic devel-
oped by L. van der Torre [23, 16, 17].
Basically, our system starts from this last conception of normative rea-
soning. First, it is based on a purely syntactic view of deontic logic so that
all the machinery consists of defining a suitable consequence relation for
dealing with norms. Second, some intuitive conditions are required to cap-
ture adequately the global interplay between the norms included in a given
normative system. In particular this is done by introducing a new logical
operator of “normative reparation” in order to make explicit the relation
between primary obligations and their related CTDs and to combine them
in single regulations. This will allow us to give a plausible reading of CTD
structures.
In what follows we first argue that, logically, CTD obligations are a spe-
cial kinds of exceptions (Section 2). Then we propose a Gentzen system
specially tailored to cope with the above intuition. In particular, as usual
with Gentzen systems, we provide general inference rules for the introduc-
tion and the elimination of a non-classical connective intended to capture
the meaning of CTD structures (Section 3). Before introducing the formal
notions of normative system, ideal situation, violation, etc., in Section 5, we
present some of the most common instances of the inference rules, and we
shortly discuss them in relation to well-know patterns of normative reason-
ing (Section 4). At this point we have all the formal machinery needed to
examine in depth some of the most important CTD paradoxes (Section 6).
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We conclude the paper with some insights about possible extensions of the
system, such as the definition of a normative consequence relation for the
notion of permission.
2 The Main Intuition of Our Approach
What is a contrary-to-duty obligation? The common reading suggests that
this is nothing but a reparational obligation of a violated norm; accordingly,
it is in force only when a violation occurs. In this paper we would like to
argue that a CTD obligation can be conceived of in a slightly different way,
namely as a special kind of normative exception.
What does it mean that a CTD obligation is an exception?
Norms are by definition violable: a norm which cannot be violated is
meaningless or, at least, seems to be useless. If a norm says that it is
obligatory to kill or not to kill, then the norm says nothing. It is not a reason
to act. In other words, norms do not concern simply what should be the
case in any ideal situation but they should be open to their violation. This
intuition is widely accepted but we feel it has not been fully investigated
from a logical point of view. If we look at realistic normative domains
(e.g., law) we realise that the obligation not to kill is usually rendered as
a norm stating an appropriate sanction which ought to follow in case of
violation. Actually, it is not by chance that H. Kelsen [14] talks about legal
obligations, called by him primary norms, as norms stipulating sanctions. A
similar approach can be found in the analysis of deontic logicians like A.R.
Anderson [3] who define ought-assertions as obligations to do something or
to repair their violations by means of sanctions. We are aware that this is
one of the most discussed issues in contemporary philosophy of norms (for
a recent overview, see, e.g., [25]) since it concerns hard problems such as
the very nature of conditional obligations. However, besides the plethora of
different opinions on this matter, a point seems intuitively clear: ff a norm
is categorical, then it does not admit violations. In logical terms this means
that it is impossible to derive secondary obligation from it, otherwise, it is
not categorical at all. In the case of CTD structures we are not dealing
with these kinds of norms but with different normative domains. Of course,
a norm-giver who makes norms as obligations conditioned to sanctions is
trying first to state what is obligatory. On the other hand, he/she is to
be ready to reply to violations. The notion of CTD norms as exceptions is
clear if we reason from the point of view of the addressee of a norm. In this
case, norms like these can be interpreted in terms of alternative reasons to
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act: do x or you will be sanctioned. Actually the addressee has two logical
options. Even the second can be acceptable; however, since it is a sanction,
it has to be considered as a normative exception to the primary obligation.
Something similar also holds in the perspective of the norm-giver. In fact,
he/she has to impose a fair and proportional sanction for the violation of a
given obligation; in this way, any action which is a violation of a primary
obligation must be understood as an “exceptional action” with respect to
what is obligatory.
In this perspective, a CTD obligation (1) is a special kind of logical
exception of the normative content of a primary obligation, and (2) is not a
usual conflicting obligation which overrides such a primary obligation. As we
shall see, an immediate consequence of this thesis is that a primary obligation
and its CTDs can and must give raise to a unique norm, expressing the true
meaning of the normative content they define in a given normative system.
Given this general background, let us see in detail why and how CTD
norms can be logically thought of as special exceptions of primary obliga-
tions. According to the usual logical account, a norm with exception can be
represented as
A ⇒ B
A,E1 ⇒ ¬B
...
A,En ⇒ ¬B
Let us now consider ⇒ as a sub-structural consequence relation ` without
the structural rules of contraction, duplication, and exchange. The main
reason for this choice is that we want to investigate the very nature of nor-
mative consequence without any commitment to the classical interpretation.
In this perspective the comma does not correspond to the classical conjunc-
tion on the left side of ` and the classical disjunction on the right side. Thus
the meaning of the expression
A1, . . . , An ` B1, . . . , Bm
is: the sequence1 A1, . . . , An comports that B1 is the case; but if B1 is not
satisfied, then B2 should be the case; if both B1 and B2 are not the case,
then B3 should be satisfied, and so on. In a normative context, this means
that the content of the obligation determined by the conditions A1, . . . , An
1In the rest of the paper we will lift the restriction that the left-hand side of ` is a
sequence and we will require that it is a set (see Definition 1). Accordingly the comma in
the left-hand side can be understood as classical conjunction.
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is B1; however the violation of B1 can be repaired by B2; in addition the
violation of the reparation B2 —in response to the violation of B1— can be
repaired by B3, and so on.
Now, let us consider the standard rules for negation, that is:
A,B ` C
A ` ¬B,C
A ` B,C
A,¬B ` C
If ¬ is an involutive operator (i.e., ¬¬A ≡ A), the effect of these rules is to
move a formula on the other side of `, changing the polarity. Accordingly,
given the normative conditional
A⇒ B (1)
and its exception
A,¬B ⇒ C (2)
we can obtain
A⇒ B,C (3)
applying the rule for the negation on (2).
The normative conditional in (1) says that B should be the case when the
condition A obtains. According to (2) C should be the case given A and ¬B;
thus (2) is, at the same time, a CTD obligation and an exception of (1). In
a classical reading of (3), “,” would correspond to the classical disjunction.
However, this is not the case in the present interpretation, where, intuitively,
the expression on the right side of ` in (3) can be thought of as
B ∨ (¬B → C) (4)
Obviously (4) is just an approximation of the meaning of the consequent
of (3) since, in classical logic, it is equivalent to B ∨ C. The idea we want
to stress out here is that, to satisfy the right-hand side of (3), one has to
satisfy at least one of them and there is a preference for the first. Thus
“B,C” corresponds to a disjunction where the order of disjuncts matters.
This suggests that we can understand (3) as a shorthand for the following
set of normative conditionals
A⇒ B (5)
A⇒ ¬B ∧ C (6)
The two conditionals are mutually exclusive and they represent two accept-
able alternatives, even if the first is preferred to the second. According to
6
this view the norm in (3) subsumes the norms in (1) and (2). In other
words it states that, given A, B ought to be the case; otherwise, under the
same condition A, C is obligatory. Therefore, not surprisingly, (3) is a CTD
obligation of (1).
What we have just said gives us the possibility of dealing with CTD
reasoning within a purely syntactic framework. The next section provides
a formalisation of CTDs in terms of a Gentzen system for the non-classical
connective ⊗, corresponding to the “,” on the right side of a normative
consequence relation ` characterising obligations. Given the intended inter-
pretation of A⊗B as “B is the reparation of A”, the connective ⊗ permits
the combination of primary and CTD obligations into unique regulations.
It has been argued that violations are different from exceptions [18, 24]. We
think this analysis is correct insofar as it maintains that a norm is still in
force even when it is violated, whereas a default like ‘birds fly’ is cancelled,
e.g., by the fact that Tweety does not fly. As a matter of fact, it is quite odd
to say that an obligation is cancelled by its violation. On the other hand,
our idea that a CTD is a special kind of exception does not mean that the
primary obligation has to be cancelled or even overridden by its CTDs. As
we shall see, we do not introduce any kind of machinery to account for the
overriding of a primary norm by its CTDs. We simply argue that a nor-
mative system containing primary and CTD obligations actually gives its
addressees the possibility to comply with either primary or, as exceptions,
secondary (tertiary, etc.) obligations. Obviously, compliance with primary
norms or their CTDs are not put at the same level, but refer to different
degrees of ideality. In this perspective, it should be noted in advance that
the introduction of ⊗ can be done iteratively depending on the number of
levels of ideality determined by the chains of CTDs contained in the nor-
mative system. This is in a way the syntactic counterpart of the thesis,
quite common in the DL community, that CTDs are semantically rendered
in a preference (ordering) semantics, where the order among sets of worlds
expresses different levels of ideality and violability.
3 A Gentzen System for CTD Obligations
First of all, let us define our formal language L. It consists of a countable set
of atomic formulas. Well-formed-formulas are then defined using the unary
connective ¬ (negation) and the binary connective ⊗ which is intended to
formalise CTD statements.
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Definition 1 Let `O be a binary consequence relation defined over P(WFF )×
WFF . Thus the expression Γ `O A is a sequent where Γ (the antecedent)
is a finite (possibly empty) set of formulas and A is a formula.
As usual in Gentzen systems the meaning of operators and connectives is
given by the rules for their introduction and elimination (cf., e.g., [20]). More
precisely, this is true in the presence of the structural rules of exchange,
duplication and contraction. Otherwise, the introduction and elimination
rules have to be supplemented by rules for the “structural” meaning of the
operators involved [8, 21].
According to Definition 1 the usual rules of contraction, duplication and
exchange hold trivially for the formulas in the antecedent. However, they
do not make any sense for the consequent so we need properties describing
the structural behaviour of ¬ and ⊗.
The only property we assume for ¬ is that it is an involutive operator,
i.e., ¬¬A ≡ A for any formula A; while the basic logical properties for ⊗
are the following:
1. A⊗ (B ⊗ C) ≡ (A⊗B)⊗ C
2.
⊗n
i=1Ai ≡ (
⊗k−1
i=1 Ai)⊗ (
⊗n
i=k+1Ai) where Aj = Ak and j < k
Condition 1 is just associativity of ⊗, while condition 2 corresponds to du-
plication and contraction. In fact, according to the intuitive reading of this
connective given in the previous section, the expression on the right side
of ` can be considered as an ordered set. However, the full meaning of the
operator ⊗ is given by a rule for its introduction (⊗I) and the corresponding
rule for its elimination (⊗E). Thus, let us see its logical characterisation wrt
the normative consequence relation `O.
Γ `O A⊗ (
⊗n
i=1Bi)⊗ C ∆,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn `O D
Γ,∆ `O A⊗ (
⊗n
i=1Bi)⊗D
(⊗I)
Γ `O A⊗B ⊗ C ∆ `O A⊗ ¬B ⊗D
Γ,∆ `O A⊗ C (⊗E)
To complete the formal description of the system we have to give the con-
ditions for > —an always true formula— and for ⊥, a generic formula for a
contradiction (or normative conflict). In particular, as we shall see, the use
of ⊥ is helpful for characterising the notion of genuine normative conflict.
> is defined in terms of ⊗; more precisely
A⊗ ¬A ≡ >. (7)
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To understand the equivalence above we have to examine the formulas in-
volved in the left-hand side of it. This formula, A ⊗ ¬A, states that the
reparation of A is ¬A; but a reparation occurs when the thing it repairs
fails, so ¬A should be the case when ¬A is the case: in other words, the
construction states that the violation of the primary obligation is, at the
same time, the content of the secondary obligation that should repair this
violation. Thus A⊗¬A is fulfilled when we have either A or ¬A; in each state
of affairs we have either A or ¬A, so any state of affairs satisfies A ⊗ ¬A2.
It is immediate to see that
A⊗> ≡ >⊗A ≡ >. (8)
In fact, A⊗> and >⊗A are always fulfilled. In the first formula, for example,
it is stated that A is obligatory; however, if ¬A, > is the reparation of this
violation, but > is always the case. Analogous considerations apply to the
second formula, thus both are equivalent to >.
Accordingly it is reasonable to stipulate that
A⊗⊥ ≡ ⊥⊗A ≡ A. (9)
Let us provide some comments on (9). Consider A ⊗ ⊥. This says that
A is the first deontic choice and that, in case of violation, ⊥ is the second
deontic choice. However, ⊥ can never be fulfilled and so, intuitively, it may
be ignored. Thus the formula is intuitively satisfied only by A. Analogously,
⊥ ⊗ A says that ⊥ is the first deontic choice, but it can never be fulfilled
and so it is always violated. The second choice is A, which is the only
possibility3.
The following rule is devised for making explicit conflicting norms (con-
tradictory norms) within the system:
Γ `O A ∆ `O ¬A
Γ,∆ `O ⊥ (I⊥)
2Given this intuitions, there are reasons for avoiding to introduce > and ⊥ in the
language. In fact, if > is equivalent to A ⊗ ¬A, it trivially follows that ⊥ corresponds
to ¬(A ⊗ ¬A). However, as we will comment in Section 7, it is not easy to provide a
meaningful and intuitive reading of the negation of ⊗-constructions. So we will prefer
here to have > and ⊥ in the formal language.
3Intuitively, the occurrence of > and ⊥ within ⊗-constructions trivialises and trans-
forms them into something very close to classic disjunctions. With > and ⊥ we have
then a limited form of exchange. Indeed, given A ⊗ > and > ⊗ A, on the one hand, and
A ⊗ ⊥ and ⊥ ⊗ A, on the other, they are equivalent, respectively, to > and A. In these
constructions any preference order among formulas is lost and the operator ⊗ gets closer
to ∨: (A ∨ >) ≡ (> ∨ A) ≡ > and (A ∨ ⊥) ≡ (⊥ ∨ A) ≡ A. This is a further support to
the interpretation of ⊗ as an ordered disjunction.
9
where
1. there is no sequent Γ′ `O X such that either ¬A ∈ Γ′ or X = A⊗ B;
and
2. there is no conditional norm ∆′ `O X such that either A ∈ ∆′ or
X = ¬A⊗B; and
3. for any formula B, {B,¬B} 6⊆ Γ ∪∆.
The meaning of these three conditions is that given two conditional norms
(sequents), we have a conflict if the normative content of the two norms is
opposite, such that none of them can be repaired, and the states of affairs
they require are consistent.
The last aspect of the system we want to deal with is the relation of
subsumption between two sequents.
Definition 2 Let n1 = Γ `O A⊗B⊗C and n2 = ∆ `O D be two sequents,
where A =
⊗m
i=1Ai, B =
⊗n
i=1Bi and C =
⊗p
i=1Ci. Then n1 subsumes
n2 iff
1. Γ = ∆ and D = A; or
2. Γ ∪ {¬A1, . . . ,¬Am} = ∆ and D = B; or
3. Γ ∪ {¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn} = ∆ and either D = A⊗
⊗k≤p
i=1 Ci or D = A.
The idea behind this definition is that the normative content of the norm
n2 is fully included in the norm n1. Thus n2 does not add anything new to
the system and it can be safely discarded.
4 Commentary and Examples
The inference rules introduced in the previous section allow us to charac-
terise formally the notion of CTD obligation with respect to `O. They are
presented there in the most general version. In order to make clearer their
intuitive meaning, in this section we will give the reader some simplified
variants which correspond to intuitive situations in which CTDs may occur.
Let us consider a norm like
Γ `O A.
Given an obligation like this, if we have that
∆,¬A `O C,
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then the latter must be a good candidate as reparational obligation of the
former. This idea is formalised as follows:
Γ `O A ∆,¬A `O C
Γ,∆ `O A⊗ C
According to this view, if there exists a conditional obligation whose an-
tecedent is the negation of the propositional content of a different norm,
then the latter is a reparational obligation of the former. In this way, the
CTD obligation can be forced to be an explicit reparational obligation with
respect to the violation of its primary counterpart. Accordingly, it seems
reasonable to discard both premises when they are subsumed by the conclu-
sion. Their reciprocal interplay makes them two related norms so that they
cannot be viewed anymore as independent obligations. Notice that if Γ and
∆ are empty, then we are dealing with the basic case in which the primary
obligation has the format of an apparently categorical obligation.
As we have alluded to above, the rule ⊗I can also generate chains of
CTDs in order to deal iteratively with violations of reparational obligations.
The following case is just an example of this process.
Γ `O A⊗B ¬A,¬B `O C
Γ `O A⊗B ⊗ C
Chains of CTDs can be manipulated in different ways. An interesting case
is when other reparations are added inside a sequence of CTDs built via the
⊗ operator. This is possible since any conditional norm can be combined
with a different obligation insofar as the former regulates the violation of
the latter. Given an obligation we may thus infer more than a single ex-
plicit new ⊗-norm conditioned to its violation: in fact, a norm-giver can
stipulate different reparations for a particular violation. The presence of
such new regulations in the normative system is equivalent to saying that
it is obligatory to fulfil the conjunction of several CTD obligations if the
same violation occurs. More precisely, even if a primary obligation can be
discarded after some applications of ⊗I, another explicit CTD regulation
can be drawn with respect to the first obligation of the chain of reparational
obligations we have already in the system:
Γ `O A⊗B ⊗ C ∆,¬A `O D
Γ,∆ `O A⊗D
What about disjunctions of CTDs? It is quite common in our every-
day experience to tackle situations where different obligations can repair
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alternatively to the violation of the primary obligation. Suppose John eats
a piece of cake even though his mother commanded him not to touch it,
since it is for some guests invited for dinner. When she realises that John
has eaten the cake she could say to John: buy another cake or apologise for
your bad action! As a matter of fact, both secondary obligations can repair
alternatively to the violation of the primary obligation. Situations like this
are also far unusual in legal contexts. It is not hard to find examples, at least
in most western countries, where the legislator states different sanctions for
certain kinds of crime as alternatives to prison. Actually, the system we
provided seems unable to capture these cases for the trivial reason that
it is based on a language which does not include the boolean connectives.
However, something very close to a disjunctive obligation can be represented
when the normative system permits the derivation of the symmetry of two
obligations wrt ⊗:
Γ `O A ¬A `O B
Γ `O A⊗B
Γ `O B ¬B `O A
Γ `O B ⊗A
In this case, A and B repair each other, so it can be said that it is obligatory
to do A or B if Γ holds.
The intuitive meaning of ⊗E can be illustrated with the help of a couple
of rules that can be derived from it. First of all, consider its trivial instance
when n = 2:
Γ `O A⊗B ∆,¬A `O ¬B
Γ,∆ `O A (10)
Informally, if the normative system contains both a reparational obligation of
A and a norm stating the negation of such a reparation as a CTD obligation
of the violation of A, then each of the two secondary obligations makes
meaningless the other as a true reparation of A. Notice that these norms do
not generate a contradiction: both premises are consistent with the original
primary obligation A. This fact should not be strange: a “contradiction”
between two secondary obligations conditioned to the violation of the same
primary obligation A is nothing but a (perhaps bizarre) way for restating A
as obligatory. The presence of B and its negation as CTDs of A is in a way
irrelevant for A. For similar reasons, we can derive a rule like the following:
Γ `O A⊗B ∆ `O A⊗ ¬B
Γ,∆ `O A (11)
In general we have to distinguish between genuine normative conflicts from
apparent ones. By normative conflict we mean any situation ruled by op-
posite norms and which results in an impossible state of affairs; or, in other
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words, a situation in which the normative content of all relevant norms
cannot be fulfilled, ending inevitably in a violation that cannot be repaired.
The simplest case of conflict of norms obtains when only two categorical
obligations are given, that is, when we have both `O A and `O ¬A. It is
immediate to see that we can apply I⊥, thus deriving `O ⊥.
Let us consider the following patterns of apparent conflicts. In the case
of
A `O B ¬A `O ¬B
the conflict is apparent because the conditions of application of the two
norms are mutually exclusive; thus situations where both norms are appli-
cable do not exist.
On the other hand, given
`O A `O ¬A ¬A `O B
we have two conflicting categorical obligations. However, a closer analysis
shows that actually one of them is not categorical insofar as it admits a CTD.
Thus the situation where the CTD obligation is in force is still normatively
acceptable, even if the corresponding primary obligation is violated. But in
this case the other categorical obligation is fulfilled.
This pattern also shows that the system at hand is nonmonotonic: the
presence of ¬A `O B prevents the application of I⊥. Hence `O A and
`O ¬A no longer derive `O ⊥.
The above discussion points out that the only conflicts we have to worry
about are the so called genuine conflicts. These mean that fragments of the
system from which a conflict can be obtained are not rational. In idealised
situations genuine conflicts should not occur. Unfortunately this is seldom
the case in real-life. Thus methods to restore rationality should be devised.
Indeed, many of them have been put forth, and it is beyond the scope of
the paper to investigate such a topic. However, unlike more traditional
treatments of CTDs, the present approach considers CTDs and normative
conflicts just as two orthogonal aspects of normative reasoning. Accord-
ingly the interested reader can try to plug-in her preferred way to deal with
(genuine) conflicts.
Let us now discuss the notion of subsumption. This notion is meant
to capture the idea that the “normative” content of a sequent (or norm)
is implicit in other sequents. As we shall see in Section 5 the idea behind
our proposal is to start from an explicitly given set of norms, a normative
system, and then compute the closure of the theory under the inference rules
described in the previous section. In other words we use the inference rules
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to generate all norms of a given normative system. Given the structure of the
inference rules it is possible that each of them can be applied with respect
to two sequents in slightly different ways, and in some cases the meaning
of the sequent resulting from such applications is already covered by other
sequents; in other cases the inference rules can produce generalisations of
the sequents used to apply the rule, and, consequently, the original rules
are no longer needed in the system. Thus some sequents can be removed
without changing the meaning of the normative system in which they occur
or from which they are derived.
Let us now examine some instances of subsumption. As an example of
the first condition of Definition 2 we have the norms
Γ `O A⊗B ⊗ C (12)
and
Γ `O A⊗B (13)
The first norm, (12), subsumes the second (13). Both norms state that given
Γ we have the obligation A, and if we fail to fulfil it —i.e., if we violate it—,
then the violation of A can be repaired by B. In other words B is a secondary
obligation arising from the violation of the primary obligation A. In addition
the first norm prescribes that the violation of the secondary obligation B
can be repaired by C. As we discussed in Section 1 norms cannot be taken
in isolation in so far as they exist in a normative system. Consequently
the meaning of a norm depends on the context the norm is embedded in,
and thus the whole normative system contributes to the meaning of a norm.
In agreement with this holistic view of norms we have that the normative
content of (13) is included in that of (12). Accordingly norm (13) does not
add any new piece of information to the normative system, it is redundant
and can be dispensed from the system.
To exemplify the second condition we take
Γ `O A⊗B (14)
and
Γ,¬A `O B (15)
It is easy to recognise that this case is a simple instance of a CTD. The first
rule says that given Γ we have the primary obligation A, whose violation
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is repaired by the secondary obligation B, while, according to the second
rule, given the same set of circumstances Γ and ¬A we have the primary
obligation B. However, the primary obligation of (15) obtains when we
have a violation of the primary obligation of the first rule, (14). Thus the
condition of applicability of the second rule includes that of the first rules,
and then they have the same normative content. Therefore the first rule is
more general than the second and we can discard the second rule from the
normative system.
For the third and last condition of Definition 2 we consider the sequents
Γ `O A⊗B ⊗ C (16)
and
Γ,¬B `O A⊗ C (17)
In this case we have a CTD of a CTD. Therefore we can repeat the same
explanation of the previous case just replacing the primary obligation with
the secondary obligation.
5 Consequence Relations and Normative Systems
Now we need to introduce a formal definition of normative system. We
distinguish between normative codes and normative systems. The former
can just be considered as the set of explicitly promulgated norms, while its
related normative system is obtained from the normative code by adding
principles to derive other norms. Formally:
Definition 3 Let D be a set of deontic notions (e.g., obligation, permission,
etc).
• A Normative Code is a set {Si}i∈D where each Si is a finite set of
norms.
• An Implicit Normative System is a set {(Si,`i)}i∈D, where each Si
is a finite set of sequents, and each `i is a normative consequence
relation for i.
• An Explicit Normative System is a set {↑ (Si,`i)}i∈D, where each
↑ (Si,`i) is the least fixed point (if it exists) of the closure under `i
and subsumption of Si.
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This is a very general definition of normative system. One of the main
advantages of an explicit normative system resides in the fact that complete
meaning and content of a norm is entirely encoded in the formulation of the
norm itself and not scattered around its normative system. In fact, in this
paper, we consider the normative system obtained from the deontic notion
of obligation and the corresponding normative consequence relation we have
investigated in Section 3. Some insights about the integration of obligation
and permission will be given in Section 7.
We are now ready to give conditions under which we are able to deter-
mine whether a state of affairs is compatible with a normative system or if it
represents a violation of some norms. To this end, we shall consider a state
of affairs as a set of literals; moreover we will restrict ourselves to the case
where all the formulas made explicit in the norms (sequents) of a normative
system are literals as well. Notice that this choice does not allow us the use
of expressions like ¬(A⊗B) on the right side of `O nor occurrences of ⊗ in
the antecedents of the sequents.
We are aware that this is a debatable limitation. However, the intuitive
meaning of ¬(A⊗B) is unclear, or at least it seems to admit several possible
interpretations. What does it mean that B is not a reparation of A?4 Until
we have a precise answer to this question we prefer not to commit ourselves
to any particular interpretation; therefore we do not give the logical meaning
of negation. Indeed, the introduction and elimination rules for ¬ have not
been given. Moreover, it is not easy to give an intuitive account of formulas
such as A⊗ B if they occur on the left side of the consequence relation. A
possible interpretation could be that such occurrences mean something like:
“It is a fact that B is a reparational obligation of A”. However, we prefer
here to refrain from presenting solutions to these problems. Of course, these
are matters of further investigation, but we feel that they can be resolved
in a satisfactory way as soon as a suitable machinery for reasoning about
norms is introduced in the system.
First of all we define when a state of affairs is either ideal, sub-ideal, or
non-ideal with respect to a norm. Then we extend these notions both to
explicit and to implicit normative systems.
Definition 4
• A state of affairs s is ideal wrt to a sequent (norm) Γ `O A1⊗· · ·⊗An
iff if Γ ⊆ s, then A1 ∈ s.
4See Section 7 for some intuitions about the relation between ¬ and ⊗ wrt an explicit
consequence relation of permission.
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• A state of affairs s is sub-ideal wrt to a sequent (norm) Γ `O A1 ⊗
· · · ⊗ An iff if Γ ⊆ s and ∃Ai, 1 < i ≤ n such that ∀Aj, j < i
{¬A1, . . . ,¬Aj} ⊆ s, then Ai ∈ s.
• A state of affairs s is non-ideal wrt to a sequent (norm) Γ `O A1 ⊗
· · · ⊗An iff it is neither ideal nor sub-ideal.
According to Definition 4, a situation is ideal wrt to a norm if the norm
is not violated; sub-ideal when the primary obligation is violated but the
norm admits a reparation, which is satisfied; non-ideal when the primary
obligation and all its reparations are violated. This definition can easily be
extended to the case of explicit normative systems:
Definition 5
• A state of affairs s is ideal wrt to an explicit normative system iff there
is no norm in the system for which s is either sub-ideal or non-ideal.
• A state of affairs s is sub-ideal wrt to an explicit normative system iff
there is a norm for which s is sub-ideal, and there is no norm in the
system for which s is non-ideal.
• A state of affairs s is non-ideal wrt to an explicit normative system
iff there is a norm for which s is non-ideal.
Definition 5 follows immediately from the intuitive interpretation of ideality
and of the related notions we have provided in Definition 4. On the other
hand, the relation between an explicit normative system and the implicit
one from which it is obtained seems to be a more delicate matter. A care-
ful analysis of the conditions for constructing an explicit normative system
allows us to state the following general criterion:
Definition 6 A state of affairs s is ideal (sub-ideal, non-ideal) wrt an im-
plicit normative system N if s is ideal (sub-ideal, non-ideal) wrt the explicit
normative system obtained from N .
It is worth noting that Definition 6 shows the relevance of the distinction
between explicit and implicit normative systems. This holds in particular
for the case of sub-ideal situations. Suppose you have an implicit normative
system consisting of the norms
`O A ¬A `O B
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The corresponding explicit normative system is
`O A⊗B
While the state of affairs s = {¬A,B} is sub-ideal wrt to the latter, it would
be non-ideal for the former. In the first case, even if ¬A `O B expresses in
fact an implicit reparational obligation of `O A, this is not made explicit. So,
there exists a situation which apparently accomplishes a norm and violates
the other without satisfying any reparation. This conclusion cannot be
accepted because it is in contrast with our intuition according to which the
presence of two norms like `O A and ¬A `O B must lead to a unique
regulation. For this reason, we can evaluate a situation as sub-ideal wrt an
implicit normative system only if it is sub-ideal wrt its explicit version.
Given the restrictions we have just discussed it is easy to show, by a
straightforward application of well-known results of set theory, that an ex-
plicit normative system for any implicit normative system always exists and
it is unique if the subsumption is applied after the computation of the clo-
sure of the implicit normative system with respect to the inference rules. To
illustrate this issue consider the following four norms
F ` A⊗G (18)
E ` A⊗B ⊗ C ⊗D (19)
E,¬A,¬B ` C (20)
E,F,¬B ` A⊗ C (21)
Here 19 subsumes 20 and ⊗I applied to 18 and 20 produces 21. However, if
we apply subsumption first we have to delete 20 and 21 is no longer derivable
from 18 and 19 alone.
Finally, let us define the notion of ought. It is intended to formalise what
any explicit normative system requires as obligatory, if a state of affairs is
given.
Definition 7 Given a state of affairs s and an explicit normative system
N , Ought(s) is a set of sets of literals O(s)− s such that for each O(s):
• s ⊆ O(s); and
• O(s) is one of the smallest sets of literals such that O(s) is at least
sub-ideal wrt N ; and
• O(s) does not contain a literal and its negation.
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This definition is meant to capture the best possible alternatives to a given
situation. It also provides a semantics for `O and ⊗. Let Γ `O A be
a sequent, and let s be the smallest state of affairs satisfying Γ. Then s
satisfies A iff Ought(s) contains a set O(s) which is at least sub-ideal with
respect to A. The above construction does not distinguish the degree of
ideality between states of affairs. It only says whether complex obligations
are fulfilled or violated by some states of affairs. For example given the
empty state of affairs and the norm
`O A⊗B,
both {A} and {¬A,B} are in Ought(∅). Therefore we have to identify the
most ideal situations: in the case at hand {A} because it is ideal, while
{¬A,B} is sub-ideal.5 Notice that in general it is not possible to determine
the most ideal situation. Let us consider the following normative system
`O A⊗ (B ⊗ C) `O A⊗ (C ⊗B)
As we have seen in Section 4, given s = {¬A}, both B and C are reparations
of A, as well as the reparation of each other. Thus the two states of affairs
s1 = {¬A,B} and s2 = {¬A,C} are both in Ought(s). It is immediate to
see that s1 is sub-ideal wrt the first norm, while for the second norm every
extension containing C or ¬C will be sub-ideal wrt it. Similarly for s2.
Besides what we said in Section 4 about the consequence relation `O,
it is worth noting that also the notion of ought exhibits a nonmonotonic
behaviour. In fact, if we consider `O as a connective, ought can be viewed
in terms of a consequence relation where Ought(s) follows from a normative
system N and a set of states of affairs. If so, not only would different
normative systems imply trivially diverse Ought(s), but, given the same N ,
different states of affairs (and different violations) could also give distinct
“oughts”. This confirms van der Torre and Tan’s [24] thesis that violability
has to be read as a special kind of defeasibility.
In very general terms, our formulation follows the intuition of Jones
and Po¨rn [12, 13] insofar as it permits us to represent the real (actual)
obligations expressed by the system. However, our approach is based on
purely syntactical notion of ideality and is strictly related to the role of
the operator ⊗. In this way, it does not suffer from some drawbacks of
5A possible solution for this problem is to supplement the definition of satisfiability by
adding a degree of violation similar to the degree of disappointment proposed by Brewka,
Benferhat and Le Berre [5] for their logic of ordered disjunction. However a careful analysis
of this topic is left as a matter of future work.
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Jones and Po¨rn’s analysis such as the necessity of introducing hierarchies of
sub-sub-ideal, sub-sub-sub-ideal worlds and so forth.
6 Dealing with CTD Paradoxes
Now, let us see how our system deals with some of the most infamous para-
doxes of CTD reasoning. In particular, we want to give a formal account
of Chisholm’s [6] and Forrester’s [7] paradoxes, Belzer’s [4] “Reykjavik sce-
nario” and Makinson’s [15] “Mo¨bius strip example”. Since these puzzles are
well-known in the deontic logic community we shall not recall any of their
intuitive examples but we will confine our analysis to their logical represen-
tation in our formalism.
Chisholm’s Paradox The basic scenario depicted in Chisholm’s paradox
corresponds to the following implicit normative system:
{`O h, h `O i, ¬h `O ¬i}
plus the situation s = {¬h}. First of all, note that the system does not
determine in itself any normative contradiction. This can be checked by
making explicit the normative system. In this perspective, a normative sys-
tem consisting of the above norms can only allow for the following inference:
`O h ¬h `O ¬i
`O h⊗ ¬i (22)
Thus, the explicit system is nothing but
{h `O i, `O h⊗ ¬i}
It is easy to see that s is ideal wrt the first norm. On the other hand, while
s is not ideal wrt `O h ⊗ ¬i, we do not know if it is sub-ideal wrt such a
norm. Then, we have to consider the two states of affairs s1 = {¬h, i} and
s2 = {¬h,¬i}. It is immediate to see that s1 is non-ideal in the system
whereas s2 is sub-ideal. If so, given s, we can conclude that the normative
system says that ¬i ought to be the case (see Definition 7).
The Gentle Murderer Let us now examin the logical structure of the
implicit system of norms which corresponds to Forrester’s scenario:
{`O ¬k, k `O g}
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Even in this case, we have a single application of ⊗I:
`O ¬k k `O g
`O ¬k ⊗ g
so that the explicit normative system is trivially as follows:
{`O ¬k ⊗ g}
As is well-known, the paradox is based to the following assumptions: (1)
k is given as a fact; (2) g implies k. In SDL such premises permits one
to apply the inference rule RM thus obtaining a normative contradiction
with the obligation ¬k. Since our formalism is not able to treat formulas
with boolean operators, it seems impossible to represent the implication of k
from g. Actually, we think this is not a real problem. It is enough to replace
k `O g with k `O k in the implicit system. Thus, the explicit system will
consist of the norm `O ¬k ⊗ k. If so, the situation s = {k} is trivially
sub-ideal wrt the system (remember that ¬k ⊗ k is equivalent to >). On
the other hand, turning back to the original formulation of the paradox, if
s is given, the system consisting of `O ¬k ⊗ g expresses consistently that g
ought to be the case. In fact, the situation s′ = {k, g} is sub-ideal wrt the
system.6
Reykjavik Scenario Consider now this version of the Reykjavik Scenario:
{`O ¬r, `O ¬g, r `O g, g `O r}
Similarly to the previous examples, we can draw the following inferences:
`O ¬g g `O r
`O ¬g ⊗ r
`O ¬r r `O g
`O ¬r ⊗ g
Accordingly, the explicit normative system is:
{`O ¬g ⊗ r, `O ¬r ⊗ g}
Given the situation s = {r}, the solution of the paradox consists in conclud-
ing that g ought to be case without deriving its negation. Actually, in our
approach this is easily obtained since the situation s′ = {r, g} is sub-ideal
wrt the explicit normative system.7
6And it is compatible with implication of k from g.
7Makinson [15] pointed out that the conclusion of g must be based on a prioritisation
among promulgations. In a way, this remark applies also to our approach insofar as
the norms of the explicit normative systems outweigh their counterparts in the implicit
normative system. Remember that in our view a CTD is considered as an exception of a
primary obligation.
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Mo¨bius Strip Finally, let us look at Makinson’s “Mo¨bius Strip” example.
Its logical structure is represented as follows:
{c `O ¬b, a `O c, b `O a}
This implicit normative system can be made explicit by drawing the follow-
ing inference:
c `O ¬b b `O a
`O ¬b⊗ a (23)
Similarly to the previous examples, the explicit normative system is as fol-
lows:
{`O ¬b⊗ a, a `O c}
Given the state of affairs s = {b}, it is expected that both a and c should be
concluded. Actually, this is what we get from the normative system since
the situation s′ = {b, a, c} is sub-ideal wrt it. In fact, if b holds, this means
that the primary obligation ¬b is violated. Accordingly, the reparational
obligation a ought to be the case. As a consequence, since a is to be given,
the obligation c should follow as well.
7 Further Extensions and Final Remarks
Our analysis of the above paradoxes has shown that the sets of norms that
characterise each of them are trivially consistent. However, even if such
paradoxes correspond to relatively simple cases, our formalism is able to
capture, at least potentially, more complicated normative structures. For
this reason, we think the notion of normative consistency seems to deserve
additional and more general remarks. A normative system is consistent if
it does not allow for any application of rule (⊥). Roughly speaking, if A or
¬A cannot be repaired by the system8, then
Γ `O A ∆ `O ¬A
should correspond to a normative contradiction. However, while this is quite
clear when A is an atom, it is more difficult to understand intuitively the
reasons why an inconsistency must occur when A is an arbitrary formula. As
previously said, a close inspection of the inference rules shows that we can
have negations of chains of reparational obligations. Thus, the question to
be solved concerns the meaning of expressions like ¬(A⊗B). The problem
8See Section 3 for the formulation of all the conditions of rule (⊥), and the end of
Section 4 for a discussion.
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is not so easy. For this reason, in Section 5 we preferred to state the condi-
tions for evaluating a situation with respect to a normative system without
considering this kinds of formula. Of course, from a certain perspective the
question could be viewed as trivial: from a logical point of view, ¬(A⊗ B)
is nothing but the negation of a non-atomic formula. On the other hand, we
think that the lack of a rule which defines the meaning of ⊗ with respect to
the negation is in a way unsatisfactory.
Since ⊗ is not a boolean connective, it is impossible to establish a suit-
able definition of it in terms of any combination of formulas built by using
⊗ and ¬.9 One of the possible lines of investigation comports to devise an
additional consequence relation corresponding to the deontic notion of per-
mission. In particular, such a consequence relation could be characterised
at least by the following basic rules:
Γ `O A
Γ `P A (24)
Γ `O A⊗B
Γ `P A
Γ `O A⊗B
Γ,¬A `P B (25)
The first rule (24) is the version in our formalism of the notorious Ought-Can
principle. The rules in 25 extend 24 to expressions containing the operator
⊗. It is easy to understand that, if a norm says that ‘A is obligatory,
otherwise B’, this must imply that both A and B are permitted.
Moreover, thanks to the introduction of `P it is possible to give a con-
vincing account of formulas like ¬(A⊗B). Since the negation applies to ⊗,
this means that B is not a reparational obligation of A and so its negation
is permitted. In other words, we can have the following rule:
Γ `O ¬(A⊗B)
Γ¬A `P ¬B (¬⊗)
Even though this seems to be a good intuition, some problems are far from
solved. Suppose one has a norm like this
Γ `O ¬(A⊗B)⊗ C
This sequent is admitted in our formalism. However, its meaning is not
clear and the application of a rule like (¬⊗) does not make sense in this
9In [5] Brewka and colleagues argued that negation transforms their nested ordered
disjunctions into standard disjunctions. In this way, the truth of ¬(A ⊗ B) makes A
and B false. Unfortunately, we do not think this solution is adequate to account for our
intended meaning of the ⊗ operator.
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case. If ¬(A⊗B) means that B is not a reparational obligation of A, then
the question is: What does C stand for?
Problems like this, as well as the role of ⊗ on the left side of ` or,
more generally, the statement of some formal properties enjoyed by the our
Gentzen system are matters of future work. Here we can just advance some
lines of future research:
• Defining an appropriate semantics for the system in order to prove
soundness and completeness. As a starting point, we expect it would
be possible to adapt the semantics with degree of satisfaction proposed
in [5] to represent ordered disjunction in logic programming and qual-
itative choice logic.
• Extending the deductive power of the system by means of non-monotonic
patterns such as cumulativity, restricted transitivity, etc.
• Combining the logic of ⊗ with a logic able to cope with normative
conflicts. Preliminary results [10, 9] show that the logic of ⊗ can be
easily combined with Defeasible Logic. This combination has proved
very successful in the representation of Business contracts where CTD
are very frequent.
To sum up we have presented a formal system for reasoning with CTD
structures in an easy and natural way. We hope that this can be extended
to other forms of normative reasoning.
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